论文总字数：26751字

摘 要

近年来，PPP（Public-private-partnership)融资模式逐渐取代了传统的政府主导模式，PPP由于能解决政府财政紧张、效率低下等问题而在国际社会被广泛运用。但PPP项目本

身具有公共物品属性，其未来运营收益可能很难弥补巨额的初始投资，因此，政府给予适当的补偿就成为PPP项目持续有效运行的关键。

首先，从公私契约合作的角度，引入PPP项目的一种单期补偿契约。然后，基于私人对政府补偿存在不公平厌恶倾向，借鉴BO模型的思想，将私人投资要求的特许收益作为其公平参照点，通过对FS模型加以改进，构建私人不公平厌恶的效用函数，从而建立私人在政府补偿下的投资决策模型。最后，通过模型求解研究私人不公平厌恶行为对其最优投资决策的影响。研究表明：当政府补偿使私人感知不利时，私人最优投资将随其不公平厌恶程度的增加而减小；而当政府补偿使私人感知有利时，私人最优投资将随其不公平厌恶程度的增加而增加；但无论政府补偿是有利的还是不利的，私人投资的期望效用或期望

利润都将随其不公平厌恶程度的增加而减小。

基于本文的研究思路，可以将本文研究内容分为如下几部分：

第一部分，即第一章。基于PPP融资模式提出的相关背景，引出了公私合作伙伴关系、相应的政府补偿问题以及补偿的公平性问题，并展开相关文献梳理与总结，从而在现有的研究基础上，对本文的研究意义和研究思路进行了详细梳理。

第二部分，即第二章。具体了解PPP项目的基本概念和特征，分析PPP项目政府补偿的必要性及其主要补偿方式，并在此基础上借鉴BO模型思想，对FS模型进行改进，构建私人公平效用函数以描述私人投资者对政府补偿的公平感知。

第三部分，即第三章。第三章首先定量描述PPP项目政府补偿契约设计问题，以特许收益为公平参考点，依据私人公平偏好倾向，构建基于政府补偿的私人效用函数；进而构建私人投资者在政府补偿情景下不公平厌恶的投资决策模型，并依据不同情形对模型进行分析求解。

最后，即第四章。第四章对情景建模进行了总结性分析，并进行了结论性阐述；同时

指出本文研究的不足之处以及未来还需进一步进行研究的问题。

关键词：PPP项目、政府补偿、公平感知、私人效用、情景建模

Private unfair PPP project investment decision-making model under the government compensation

Abstract

In recent years, PPP(Public-private-partnership) financing mode gradually replaced the traditional government dominated mode. The PPP as can solve the problem of government financial stress, such as low efficiency and is widely used in international society. But the PPP project itself has the public goods attribute, its operating income in the future may be difficult to make up for the huge initial investment. Therefore, the government give appropriate compensation is a key to sustained and effective operation of the PPP project.

Firstly, a single period compensation contract is introduced for the PPP project from the contract of public and private cooperation. Then, based on the private unfairness-averse behavior for the governmental compensation, the private claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point according to the idea of BO model. And by improving the FS model, the private unfairness-averse utility function is established, thus the decision-making model of private investor for the PPP project is set up under the governmental compensation. Finally, the effect of private unfairness-averse behavior on the optimal investment is studied by solving the model. The research shows that: when the private investor has an unfavorable perception on the governmental compensation, the private optimal investment will decrease with the increase of its unfairness-averse degree; when the private investor has a favorable perception on the governmental compensation, the private optimal investment will increase with the increase of its unfairness-averse degree; however, whether the governmental compensation is favorable or unfavorable for the private investor, the private expected utility or expected profit will decrease with the increase of its unfairness-averse degree.

In detail, this research contents include the following sections:

The first part is the first chapter. Based on the background that PPP financing model has been put forward,  the public-private partnership, the corresponding government compensation and the fairness issue of compensation have been raised. The literature has been reviewed and summarized. On the basis of the existing research, the research significance and ideas will be given in this paper.

The second part is the second chapter. Understand the basic concepts and characteristics of PPP project, analysis the necessity of PPP project government compensation and its main compensation mode, improve the FS model, build private fair utility function on the basis of reference to BO model thought to describe the private investors fairness perceptions of the compensation for the government.

The third part consists of the third chapter. The third chapter firstly quantitatively describes the PPP project the government compensation contract design problem, franchise earnings as fair reference point, the private utility function ha been built based on the government compensation. Build private investors in the government compensation situation of unfair investment decision model and analysis to solve the model according to the different situation.

The forth part consists of the forth chapter. The fourth chapter of scene modeling has carried on the summary analysis and expounded the conclusive. At the same time,  the deficiencies and problems still need further study in the future, which has been pointed out in this paper.

Key words: PPP project; governmental compensation; unfairness-aversion; optimal investment

目录

摘要 I

Abstract III

第一章 绪论 1

1.1 研究意义 1

1.2 国内外研究现状 3

1.2.1 PPP项目私人投资与政府补偿研究 3

1.2.2 私人投资不公平厌恶行为研究 4

1.2.3 现有研究不足之处 5

1.3 研究思路 5

第二章 PPP项目政府补偿的私人公平感知及其效用表示 7

2.1 PPP项目的基本概念与特征 7

2.1.1 PPP项目基本概念 7

2.1.2 PPP项目基本特征 8

2.1.3 PPP项目各利益主体的关系特征 9

2.2 PPP项目补偿的必要性及主要方式 10

2.2.1 PPP项目补偿的必要性 11

2.2.2 PPP项目补偿的主要方式 11

2.3 私人投资者对政府补偿的公平感知及其效用表示 11

2.3.1 PPP项目私人投资的影响因素 12

2.3.2 私人投资的公平感知行为 12

2.3.3 私人公平感知效用表示 13

第三章 PPP项目政府补偿下不公平厌恶私人投资决策模型 14

3.1 PPP项目补偿的政府契约设计 14

3.2 不公平厌恶私人投资决策模型 15

3.2.1 模型构建与相关假设 15

3.2.2 模型求解与私人决策 17

3.3 私人不公平厌恶对其投资决策的影响 20

第四章 结论与展望 21

参考文献 22

致谢 24

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