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PASSAGE 1

Recommended routes across the North Atlantic have been followed since 1898, when the risk of collision between increasing numbers of ships became too great, particularly at junction points. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) codifies the use of certain routes. These routes vary with the seasons, with winter and summer tracks chosen so as to avoid iceberg prone areas. These routes are often shown on charts, particularly small scale ones, and are generally used to calculate distances between ports in tables. Recommended routes consists of single tracks, either one-way or two-way. Two-way routes show the best water through confined areas such as inland routes among islands and reefs. Ships following these routes can expect to meet other vessels head-on and engage in normal passings. One-way routes are generally found in areas where many ships are on similar or opposing courses. They are intended to separate opposing traffic so that most maneuvers are overtaking situations instead of the more dangerous meeting situation.

PASSAGE 2

Every ship navigating in an area subject to tropical storms during the season of their occurrence should be constantly on the alert for any sign of their approach so that steps can be taken to avoid the danger zone while there is still time and sea-room.

In accordance with the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea it is the duty of every ship which suspects the presence or formation of a tropical revolving storm immediately to inform other vessels and shore authorities with all the means at her disposal. Weather reports should be made by radio at frequent intervals, giving as much information as possible, especially barometer readings.

More detailed information regarding oceanic winds and weather can be found in the Atlases of Monthly Meteorological Charts, while detailed information relating to specific localities is given in the Admiralty Sailing Directions.

PASSAGE 3

The main buoyancy chamber shall be divided into not less than two separate compartments, each inflated through a non-return inflation valve on each compartment. The buoyancy chambers shall be so arranged that, in the event of any one of the compartment being damaged or failing to inflatable, the intact compartments shall be able to support, with positive freeboard over the liferaft rsquo; s entire periphery, the number of persons which the liferaft is permitted to accommodate, each having a mass of 75 kg and seated in their normal positions.

The liferaft shall be capable of being inflated by one person. The liferaft shall be inflated with a non-toxic gas. Inflation shall be completed within a period of 1 min at an ambient temperature of - 30 ℃. After inflation the liferaft shall maintain its form when loaded with its full complement of persons and equipment.

Each inflatable compartment shall be capable of withstanding a pressure equal to at least 3 times the working pressure and shall be prevent from reaching a pressure exceeding twice the working pressure either by means of relief valves or by a limited gas supply. Means shall be provided for maintaining the working pressure.

PASSAGE 4

One of the major problems is that flooding of a hold space may occur without the knowledge of the crew, particularly in heavy weather conditions where visibility may be minimal and any changes in the response of the ship may be masked by the storm. The influence of flooding No. 1 hold on a bulk carrier carrying ore, from a naval architecture point of view, is of course to create a significant trim by the head. It is considered that on a well maintained ship this should be a survivable situation. In the event that flooding progress to the adjacent No. 2 hold then the consequent trim can immerse the deck forward and the survivability of the ship under storm condition becomes doubtful. Another is also important and if this is a consequence of transverse watertight bulkhead failure then the shock loadings, both in terms of over and under pressures could create a chain reaction involving hatch covers being displaced, bulkheads collapsing, etc. , within a few seconds resulting in an almost instantaneous loss of hull buoyancy and the ship sinking. Knowing when the holds are taking in water is, therefore, considered very important.

PASSAGE 5

The bulk carrier, long recognized as the workhorse of the world merchant fleet, has over the years had its design refined and optimized on the basis of previous successful experience. This provided what many considered to be a relatively uncomplicated and safe structural configuration.

Recently, and regrettably with loss of human lives, a series of tragic ship losses has focused the attention of the marine industry and the public on the performance and inherent safety of this ship type.

Extensive research and development, principally by the major classification societies, has highlighted the possible causes of the bulk carrier losses and brought about necessary changes to the design and scantlings for new ships. For existing ships, improvements to safety are anticipated through the enforcement of the aft transverse watertight bulkhead, and the double bottom structure in way of the foremost cargo hold, the introduction of a more rigorous survey regime and greater attention to operating procedures, particularly during cargo loading and discharge, in order to avoid overstressing of the structure or mechanical damage.

PASSAGE 6

The ship is equipped with a comprehensive fire protection and fire fighting installation including water and CO₂ high pressure systems, and portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the

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