论文总字数：18133字

摘 要

2015年1月1日起正式实施“央企限薪令”，不少上市商业银行也包含在这次政策中，引入年度薪酬、绩效薪酬和任期内激励薪酬等，并给出了目前央企领导人的薪酬上限。在这个背景下，研究此政策对高层收入到底带来怎样的影响，并进行相应的分析发现国有商业银行高层年薪过低，激励不够，不同类型银行薪酬差距大。借助一些理论对此做了一些简单剖析，利用数据进行了统计分析，并对上市商业银行高层激励制度给出了几点意见。

2015年实行“限薪令”后，国有五大行的高层薪酬水平下降较多，与非国有银行薪酬差异大，激励严重不足，出现高素质人才慢慢流失，现有高层管理者年龄偏大，属于国有五大行正面临的巨大危机。借助博弈论和格雷欣法则分析，绩效奖金递延支付逐渐成为银行高级管理层激励机制重要部分，不同职责的高层绩效奖金占总收入比不同，基本形成以绩效为基础的激励，不断的完善激励制度，但是长期激励仍然没有广泛使用，并没有很好的结合短长期激励。本文的研究高层薪酬仅包含披露的税前薪酬，并没有包含一些隐性的，高层管理者的其他收入不得而知。建议改变国有商业银行高级管理层的组织制度，否则在实质上还是在走行政组织任命的老路，国有银行不能够在经济快速发展的时代与时俱进。

关键词：上市商业银行 高层 激励

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Senior Managers in Listed Commercial Banks

Abstract

To implement the "central enterprises limit salary order" formally from January 1, 2015, many listed commercial banks are also included in this policy, the introduction of annual remuneration, performance pay and incentive remuneration during the term, etc , And gives the current cap of the central enterprises leaders cap. In this context, to examine the effect of this event on high-level income in the end, and the corresponding analysis found that state-owned commercial banks high salary is too low, incentives are not enough, different types of bank pay gap. Some of the theories are used to do some simple analysis, the use of data for statistical analysis, and gives a few comments on the senior managers incentive system of the listed commercial banks.

After the implementation of the "limit order" in 2015, the level of senior management of state-owned banks decreased more, with non-state-owned bank pay difference, a serious shortage of incentives, the emergence of high-quality talent slowly lost, the existing senior managers older, belonging to the five major state-owned banks are facing a huge crisis. With the help of game theory and Gresham's rule analysis, deferred payment of performance bonus gradually becomes an important part of the senior management incentive mechanism of banks. The senior managers' performance bonuses of different duties are different from the total income ratio, forming performance-based incentives, and the incentive system is constantly being perfected. But the long-term incentive is still not widely used, and there is no good combination of short and long-term incentives. The high-level remuneration of this paper contains only the pre-tax remittance, and does not contain some hidden, high-level managers of other income is unknown. It is proposed to change the organizational system of the senior management of state-owned commercial banks. Otherwise, the state-owned banks can not keep up with the times in the era of rapid economic development.

Key words：Listed Commercial Bank; Senior Management; Incentive

目录

摘 要 I

Abstract II

第一章 引言 1

1.1 背景 1

1.2本文研究的目的与意义 1

1.3国内外相关文献综述 1

1.3.1国外文献综述 1

1.3.2国内文献综述 2

1.4研究方法与研究思路 2

第二章 商业银行高级管理层激励机制的相关概念与理论 4

2.1 商业银行高层激励机制相关概念 4

2.1.1商业银行 4

2.1.2高层管理者 4

2.1.3激励 4

2.2 商业银行高层激励机制相关理论 4

2.2.1委托代理理论 4

2.2.2需求层次理论 4

2.2.3公平理论 5

第三章 上市商业银行高层激励机制的分析 6

3.1商业银行高层管理者激励的特征 6

3.1.1商业银行高层激励机制内容 6

3.1.2不同类型商业银行高层激励机制特征 6

3.2上市商业银行高层激励现状描述统计分析 8

3.2.1样本选取 8

3.2.2商业银行高层激励现状描述性统计分析 8

3.3上市商业银行高层激励的问题分析 13

3.3.1商业银行高层激励问题的定性分析 13

3.3.2国有银行高层管理者激励不够的博弈论分析 15

3.3.3不同职责的银行高层薪酬水平及风险奖金比例有差异 16

第四章 政策建议 18

4.1改变国有商业银行高级管理层的组织制度 18

4.2加强上市银行信息披露监督 18

4.3构建银行业职业经理人制度，培育职业经理人市场 18

4.4银行试点构建任务型激励方案 18

结语 19

参考文献 20

致 谢 22

上市商业银行高层激励机制研究

第一章 引言

1.1 背景

2008年美国次贷危机让许多金融企业破产倒闭，发生原因的分析和发生过后的调整慢慢的让大家关注银行的治理。而企业管理很关键的方面就是对高层人员的管理，因为一个企业的经营，最根本是对人员的经营管理，合适的人事安排，合适的薪酬绩效方案才会有效果最佳的企业经营效益，而银行也不除外。

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