摘 要

ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………II

第一章 引言………………………………………………………………………1

1.1 研究问题的现实意义………………………………………………………1

1.2 主要分析工具——演化博弈论……………………………………………3

1.3 研究目标……………………………………………………………………4

第二章 国内外研究动态综述…………………………………………………5

2.1关于共享经济的研究………………………………………………………5

2.2.1 共享经济的内涵……………………………………………………5

2.2.2 共享经济的类型和基本要素………………………………………5

2.2.3共享经济的现实问题和完善方法…………………………………6

2.2 关于演化博弈论的研究………………………………………………… 7

2.2.1演化博弈论的理论研究……………………………………………8

第三章 演化博弈理论…………………………………………………………9

3.1演化博弈基本概念……………………………………………………… 9

3.2演化博弈模型及其解决方法……………………………………………10

3.2.1完全理性条件下的静态博弈………………………………………10

3.2.2有限理性条件下的演化博弈………………………………………10

第四章 政府监管与共享单车平台的博弈模型…………………………12

4.1模型假设…………………………………………………………………12

4.2静态模型假设……………………………………………………………13

4.3动态演化博弈模型分析…………………………………………………14

4.3.1模型假设……………………………………………………………14

4.3.2求解…………………………………………………………………15

4.3.3行为分析……………………………………………………………16

第五章 结论与建议………………………………………………………… 19

参考文献…………………………………………………………………………22

政府监管部门、共享单车平台与民众出行方式选择之间的演化博弈

摘 要

解决了“最后一公里”难题的共享单车在当今民众的出行方式中十分流行。然而共享单车平台的急速发展也带来了许多问题。例如没有得到规范停放的共享单车会在一定程度上扰乱城市秩序，成为城市文明形象路上的绊脚石；大量单车被损被盗同时也导致共享单车平台对共享单车的维护成本过高；共享单车平台一味追求用户规模、融资以及扩张市场带来诸多问题，甚至资金链断裂，携带客户押金逃跑。因此亟待政府相关部门加强监管，才能规范共享单车平台、保证民众的人身安全与财产安全、维护城市和道路秩序，才能让共享单车这一新生事物在正确的轨道上越走越远。

本文从博弈论的视角出发，对政府监管与共享单车平台之间的关系，共享单车平台与民众出行方式选择之间的关系分别建立静态博弈模型，进行均衡分析。聚焦在政府监管之下共享单车平台开发赢利点的战略选择问题，构建政府监管机构与共享单车平台两方群体的演化博弈模型，将完全理性条件下的完全信息静态博弈与有限理性条件下的动态演化博弈方法进行对比，对不同的稳定性条件下各方的行为策略选择进行探讨，分析政府监管行为和共享单车平台战略选择的动态演化过程和演化稳定的影响因素，对政府监管成本、政府对平台的资金扶持与共享单车平台的收益、运营维护成本、收益损失、扩张速度之间的联系做出合理分析。研究表明，共享单车平台和政府监管的策略选择都受到众多因素的影响，如共享单车平台之间追求利润点的网络效应和发展战略的选择，和政府调控收入的平台、运营成本、收入损失和政府监管成本,政府监管机构和公众对共享单车平台的理解程度等等。最后本文关于政府怎样才能做到既对共享单车平台进行有效的监管，又能做到确保民众出行的安全与方便；共享单车平台要如何建立和完善民众使用单车的奖惩机制，如何能以最低的成本将政府监管的优势最大化等问题提出了一些见解。

关键词：政府监管 共享单车平台 演化博弈 纳什均衡 动态复制方程

Abstract

Bike sharing which solves the problem of "last mile" is very popular among people nowadays. However, the rapid development of bike sharing platforms has also brought many problems. For example, the disorderly parking of sharing bicycles disturbs the spatial management of the city and affects the civilized image of the city. A large number of bikes have been damaged and stolen resulting in high cost of bike sharing platform. The share platform blindly pursues users' scale, financing and market expansion, which brings many problems, and even breaks the capital chain, and takes customers' deposit to escape. Accordingly to relevant government departments to strengthen supervision, to regulate sharing bike platform, to ensure that the people personal safety and property safety, maintaining the order of cities and roads, to make Shared cycling this new thing on the right track more walk more far.

In this paper, from the perspective of game theory,the static game model is built up to study the relationship between the government regulation and bike sharing platform, bike sharing platform and the choice of public transportation. Focused on government regulation under the issue of strategic choice bike sharing platform development profit points, the evolutionary game model between the governmental regulatory agency and the sharing bicycle platform is constructed. The static game of complete information under the condition of complete rationality is compared with the dynamic evolutionary game method under the condition of limited rationality. This paper discusses the behavioral strategy choice of different parties under different stability conditions, and analyzes the dynamic evolution process and the influencing factors of the strategic choice of governmental supervision behavior and Shared bicycle platform. At the same time, it makes a reasonable analysis of the relationship between the government's supervision cost, the government's financial support to the platform and the sharing of the benefits, operating and maintenance costs, profit loss and expansion speed of the bicycle platform. This paper makes a reasonable analysis of the relationship between the government's supervision cost, the government's financial support to the platform and the sharing of the benefits, operating and maintenance costs, profit loss and expansion speed of the bicycle platform. Studies have shown that Shared cycling platform and the government regulation strategy choice is influenced by many factors, such as Shared cycling platform between the pursuit of profit point of network effects and the choice of development strategy, and government regulation income platform, operating costs, loss of income and government supervision cost, government regulators and the public understanding of platform bicycle sharing degree and so on. Finally, this paper discusses how the government can effectively supervise the bike sharing platform and ensure the safety and convenience of the public. How to set up and perfect the reward and punishment mechanism for people to use bicycle, and how to maximize the advantage of government regulation at the lowest cost are some Suggestions.

KeyWords:Government regulation,;Bike sharing platform,;Game theory,;Nash equilibrium; Replicator dynamics equation